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Abstract: 
In this paper the impact of the introduction of the Euro on the vertical price transmission in 
German food markets is analyzed. It is hypothesized that following the introduction of the 
Euro the presence of money illusion might have lead to higher real prices, and if so it is likely 
accompanied by higher margins between respective wholesale and retail prices. While other 
studies have mainly focused on the behavior of average prices, here reactions at the individual 
store level are investigated. For cucumber and carrots the vertical price relationships between 
retail and wholesale prices are estimated by employing an error correction approach, which is 
enhanced to test for structural breaks with a flexible time frame using a F-max approach. The 
results indicate significant changes in the vertical price relationships for one forth of the 
retailers under study. Though significant the directions of changes do not uniquely fit the 
theoretical predictions for money illusion. Thus, the majority of German food retailers has not 
used the introduction of the Euro to increase their mark ups. 
 
1 Introduction 
The implementation of a single European currency, taking full effect in January 2002, has 
received a great attention from the public, the press, and the academic society. Much of 
academic literature has discussed the question of whether Europe is an optimal currency area 
and has emphasised the incremental increase in the stability of the exchange rate system when 
the Euro is finally fully adopted (e.g. Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993; De Grauwe, 1994; 
Obstfeld and Peri, 1998). Other works share the popular view that the adoption of the single 
European currency is a more fundamental change. They explored the role of the Euro as an 
international currency and suggest that the Euro may become a ‘vehicle currency’, which 
competes with the US Dollar (e.g. Hartmann, 1996; Portes and Rey, 1998). More recently, 
Devereux, Engel and Tille (1999) focussed on the issue how the Euro may alter the 
responsiveness of consumer prices to exchange rate changes. Their central conjecture is that 
the acceptance of the Euro will lead European prices to become more insulated from 
exchange rate fluctuations, much the way U.S. consumer prices already are. 
  In contrast, only few studies examining the direct impact of the Euro introduction on 
European consumers’ price responsiveness and retail firms’ price setting behaviour and thus 
in turn on real price levels. This seems to be surprising, since, with the beginning of the new 
century, there was a growing concern among consumers about possible abuses and cheating   3
on (consumer-, retail) prices during the changeover to the Euro cash (Aucremanne and 
Cornille, 2001). In particular, the public as well as the press feared that the retail sector would 
use the cash changeover to carry out ‘hidden’ price increases. Moreover several descriptive 
statistics suggest remarkable price changes in some retail sub-sectors during the first month in 
2002 compared with the same periods in 2001.  
Aucremanne and Cornille (2001) simulate (real) price changes in the Belgian retail 
sector resulting from recalculations of all ‘attractive’ prices and psychological pricing points, 
respectively in national currency into Euro. They report slight positive effects on the 
consumer price index ranging from 0.54% to 0.72%. However, the authors suggest that their 
simulation results are very unrealistic, as factors such as competition on product markets, the 
prevailing demand conditions, and the commitments made by organisations representing the 
firm/retail sector retrain the possibility of rounding up. In addition, the authors emphasize the 
problem of isolating the Euro-induced rounding effects from ‘regular’ price changes. 
Similarly, Diller and Brambach (2002) empirically examine the extend of Euro attractive 
price adjustments in the German retail sector around the year 2001/2002. They report that 
only 30% of the sampled retail prices were converted into Euro attractive prices, whereof less 
than 10 percent were rounded up. All in all, the authors did not find remarkable Euro-induced 
rounding effects and thus real price adjustments in the German retail sector due to the 
introduction of the Euro.  
In addition to the rounding effects, Brandstetter and Kehl (2000) offer another 
explanation for possible Euro-induced real price adjustments for the Austrian beverage sector. 
The authors experimentally test if consumers alter their willingness to pay when prices are 
displayed in Euro instead of Schilling (national currency). Results of conjoint analyses 
suggest that consumer demand responses vary between Euro and Schilling prices, which in 
turn may lead to real price adjustments.
1 
In this study we do not evaluate the potential relevance of these findings. We do, 
however, argue that menu costs and particularly money illusion have been dismissed as 
potential candidates for the examination of Euro-induced real price adjustments in the 
German food retail sector. It is therefore hypothesized that the existence of both menu costs 
and money illusion might have lead to higher real prices as a result of the Euro, and if so it 
                                                 
1 Brandstetter and Kehl (2000) do not explicitly evaluate the impact on real price adjustments.    4
must be accompanied with a higher margin between the respective wholesale and retail price. 
Thus, we test for structural breaks in the margins. Moreover, we estimate the timing and 
duration of Euro-induced price adjustments in the German food retail sector. In particular, as 
retail stores might have anticipated the effects of the nominal shock and because the impact is 
expected to vanish over time we use a model that allows for flexible starting and end points as 
well as for smooth transition back to the real price equilibrium prior to the introduction of the 
Euro.
2 
While other studies have mainly focused on the behavior of average prices, we study 
reactions at the individual store level. A unique data set of weekly food prices for 271 
individual retail stores is used. We choose two homogenous products for the analysis, 
cucumber and carrots. Because of the non stationary behavior of the price series, an error 
correction (ECM) approach is applied to quantify the vertical price transmission between 
retail and wholesale prices. A standard error correction model is expanded to capture potential 
structural break points triggered by the introduction of the Euro. As mentioned above, instead 
of using the date of the introduction of the Euro as a natural break point we endogenously 
determine the break points.   
The paper is organized as follows. In section two we present a brief discussion of the 
theory to explain the impact of the Euro introduction on the vertical price transmission. In 
section three data and sampling issues are described and discussed. In section four and five 
the model specification is developed and the empirical results are summarized. Finally some 
conclusions are drawn. 
2 Brief review of the theory 
The literature so far provides four arguments for the impact of the introduction of the Euro on 
the retail price transmission. A first argument, which is often mentioned, is the rounding of 
Euro prices into ‘attractive’ prices. Converted to Euro, attractive prices in national currency 
may not look attractive anymore, which could give rise to temptation to round prices up (or 
down) to the nearest attractive price in Euro. In this paper, we do not explicitly examine this 
                                                 
2  It should be noted that our empirical approach does not allow to distinguishing between the impacts of menu 
cost or money illusion on real retail prices. We estimate a cumulative effect of any cause that appears in the 
period of the introduction of the Euro. However, the occurrence of structural breaks before January 2002 
indicates the role of anticipated effects by the retailers.   5
argument since previous studies (e.g. Diller and Brambach, 2002) signal that rounding effects 
can be neglected.  
A second argument is based on the impact of menu costs
3 that is the price adjustment 
itself might cause some costs of adjustment. For example, Levy et al. (1997) and Dutta et al. 
(1999) provide a quantification of menu costs in US retail markets, demonstrating that they on 
average account for 27% to 35% of net profit margins. The introduction of the Euro might 
have caused such menu costs which in the following might have passed on to the consumer 
via retail price increases. The major part of these costs is attributable to the IT infrastructure 
(e.g. currency adjustments in cash registers and PC’s), staff training and internal 
communication. Retailing differs from other branches in a larger proportion of costs incurred 
in modifying payment points, additional cash handling, special security measures and dual 
pricing. As these costs represent only 1% to 3% of the turnover (Müller-Hagedorn and Zielke, 
1998) significant price impacts are not very likely. However, assuming retail stores act as 
price setter these adjustment costs lead to price increases in order to stabilize the profit 
margins at least in the short term. In addition (supplementary) charges, i.e. the difference 
between wholesale and retail prices, will increase ceteris paribus. However, because of the 
menu costs’ share is small and food prices are adjusted regularly, we do not expect significant 
effects following the Euro introduction.  
   Third, the presence of money illusion might be an important source of Euro-induced 
retail price adjustments. Wassily Leontief (1936) defined money illusion as a violation of the 
‘homogeneity postulates’, which stipulates that demand and supply functions are homogenous 
of degree zero in all (nominal) prices. Thus only relative price changes matter. Shafir, 
Diamond and Tversky (1997) provided questionnaire evidence for the presence of money 
illusion. Their results suggest that preferences of people as well as their perceptions of 
constraints are affected by nominal and not only by real values. Moreover many people do 
also expect other peoples’ behaviours to be affected by money illusion. Fehr and Tyran (2001) 
provided experimental evidence that money illusion affects the price adjustment process 
following a monetary shock. The results indicate for a negative shock (smaller units) firms 
tend to increase real prices. This is particularly true, when firms believe that nominal prices of 
other firms are kept close to the pre-shock equilibrium (see also Haitwanger and Waldman, 
                                                 
3 Menu costs consist of printing new price labels or menus, new prices advertisements, setting new prices in the 
cashier system etc.   6
1989). Similar, real price increases might be likely when consumers suffer from money 
illusion. This follows from a higher marginal willingness to pay in the case of a negative 
monetary shock (Brandstetter and Kehl, 2000). As in the case of menu costs, the presence of 
money illusion might lead to higher real Euro food retail prices and thereby to increased retail 
margins. The experiments also indicate that the effects of money illusion fade in time (Fehr 
and Tyran, 2001). 
Finally, the Euro introduction might have induced some strategic behaviour of 
retailers. Firstly, because of a great public debate prior to the introduction of the Euro, 
retailers might have tried to hide their (real) price adjustments by anticipating or delaying 
their reaction. To overcome consumers’ concerns of Euro related increases in prices and 
margins after the first of January 2002, retailers might have anticipated or postponed these 
adjustments to some weeks or month. Although, economic theory do not provide strong 
arguments for this hypothesis, it seems at least plausible that firms might have applied such 
strategies. Secondly, contrary to the money illusion hypothesis some retailers might have cut 
prices and margins following the Euro introduction to reinforce their low price strategy and to 
overcome potential consumer ‘protests’. Moreover, retailers could have raised prices in 
advance to fake a real price cut after the Euro introduction to seemingly reemphasize their 
low-price strategy.  
To summarize, the impact of the introduction of the Euro on the retail price 
transmission might be a result of a mix of the four effects and pricing strategies mentioned 
above. While, it is expected that the presence of menu costs and in particular money illusion 
lead to higher retail margins, the impact of both ‘price rounding’ and the timing on price 
adjustment is less clear. For example, if sellers have anticipated price adjustments, real price 
decreases at the date of the Euro introduction could be observed. Therefore, we employ a 
flexible time series approach to identify any potential structural change related to a certain 
period prior and post the introduction of the Euro. As all the above discussed effects by an 
inherent one time deflationary shock are assumed to be temporary, our approach is designed 
to allow for a smooth transition back to the pre-shock equilibrium. Though the outlined 
effects describe output price reactions only, we include wholesale prices to separate the 
effects of coincidental costs changes.  
3 Data and sample reduction 
We use weekly food retail and wholesale food prices for Germany from October 2000 to   7
March 2002 which makes a total of 131 observations for each individual retailer. The data has 
been provided by the “Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtstelle” (ZMP) in Bonn, Germany. To 
inform consumers and retailers about the developments in food retail prices, the ZMP has set 
up a price reporting system on a weekly basis. The ZMP maintains a network of roughly 450 
so-called ‘Melder’ (‘melden’ = to report) who visit about 1,300 retail food stores in Germany 
and collect price data for a variety of standard fresh foods.
4 The sample is designed to 
represent the geographic regions and the type of stores with respect to their population values. 
Thus, the ZMP tries to reflect the relative weights of the region measured by its population 
and the number of store types for the underlying population in construction of the sample. 
Germany is divided into 8 geographic regions for this purpose, and retail stores are divided 
into 6 categories (small supermarkets (SSM: primarily food less than 400 square meter 
shopping area), big supermarkets (BSM: primarily food more than 400 but less than 800 
square meter shopping area), combined supermarkets (CSM: food and other items more than 
800 square meter shopping area), discounter (DC: primarily food with self service), butchers 
(BU), fruit and vegetable markets (FV)). In accordance to the relative weights given by the 
underlying populations with respect to regional, peoples’, and store types’ aspects the ZMP 
decides what kind of store from what region enters the sample.  
To ensure the homogeneity of food products, the Melder is given detailed instructions 
on the quality of the product and the measure (price per piece or per kg). The Melder decides 
on what day of the week she visits the stores to report on. Special offers are to be considered. 
The Melder fills out a standard sheet that is send back to the ZMP weekly. The ZMP does not 
publish individual store prices or any information on the price setting behaviour. Instead, on a 
weekly or monthly basis, average prices for regions and store types for all products are 
published.
5  
                                                 
4 The list of products does only include some processed items, such as butter, yoghurt, or sausage. 
5  The data sent by the Melder are processed as follows by the ZMP prior to publishing: 
i)  Removal of ‘obvious outliers’ (e.g. misplaced decimal points) by hand and removal of observations that 
deviate by more than 2.6 standard deviations from the mean. Roughly 1-2 % of the available 
observations are lost in this way.  
ii)  Calculation of the unweighted average price for each store type within a region. 
iii)  Calculation of the regional average as a weighted average of the store type averages from ii), with 
weights equal to share of each store type in total purchases of the commodity in question.   8
The ZMP-panel is designed to be a random sample of the above-mentioned types of 
food stores in Germany. However, reporters decide on the store they visit to report prices and 
neither the reporter nor the store she selects is chosen a priori randomly. As we do not have 
information about the group of reporters, such as age, education, income etc. we can only 
speculate towards which direction the actual sample might be biased. For instance, it is likely 
that low income pensioners are over represented in the sample of reporters; thus, it might well 
be that these people prefer to report on low price stores. In this case estimates of average 
prices or conclusions drawn from our analysis might be biased with respect to the underlying 
population. By controlling the regional number of stores and the number of the various store 
types, potential biases of sample parameters due to these characteristics are limited. 
For our study we selected two out of the 56 food products available. As we focus on 
the price transmission behaviour during the introduction of the Euro we aim to get a full panel 
data set. We first selected the food products by excluding the items that are only offered 
seasonally, such as cherries, by excluding the products that are only reported on a monthly 
basis, such as milk products or bread. Between the remaining we selected those that maximize 
the number of observations; by this sampling we aimed to maximise the number of stores with 
a continuous reporting over time. We define continuous price reporting by availability of 
price observations for each product in more than 95 % of all weeks in the sample. For missing 
observations we set the price of the product in the week before. This entire selection process 
reduced the number of observations by about 80 percent. For the products under study we end 
up with retail price data for 271 stores. Prices are reported in German cent or pennies per 
kilogram in the case of carrots and in German cent or pennies per piece in the case of 
cucumber. Since 2002 prices are reported in Euro cent. For the analysis prices in the pre Euro 
                                                                                                                                                          
iv)  Calculation of the national average price for each store type as the weighted average of the store type 
averages from ii), with regional population shares as weights. 
v)  Calculation of the national average over all store types as the weighted average of the regional averages 
from iii), with regional population shares as weights. 
vi)  Average product prices are only published if at least 100 observations were available over all store types 
and regions. 
The resulting regional, store type and national averages for each food product are published weekly and also 
provide the basis for a variety of monthly, quarterly, and annual publications produced by the ZMP (see ZMP 
internet page at http://www.zmp.de). Furthermore, this data is reproduced in many other publications, such as 
local farm journals and consumer affairs publications etc.   9
period are transformed by applying the official conversion rate of 1.95583 Deutschmark per 
Euro.  
To study the vertical price transmission we also collected wholesale prices of 
cucumber and carrots. As prices at the wholesale level indicate a high level of market 
integration we use average wholesale prices in Germany to reflect buying in prices for 
retailers.
6 These data are also available weekly and are also provided by the ZMP (2003). The 
average retail prices and the corresponding wholesale prices for the period from January 2001 
to April 2003 are shown in Figure 1.
7 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Figure 1 shows no obvious significant structural break related to the introduction of the Euro 
for the aggregate series. The aggregate retail price is here the simple average over the 
individual stores’ prices. For the individual stores, information on the corresponding zip code 
(exact regional location), the type of the store (see above for definition), the name of the store, 
and the company that owns the store are also available. The stores in our final sample belong 
to type and companies shown in Table 1. Because of confidentiality reasons, the real names of 
the companies have been suppressed and substituted for alphabetical letters.
8 
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                 
6  We collected prices from various German wholesale markets. These prices are highly integrated and the 
hypothesis that prices appear identical from a statistical point of view could not be rejected. Therefore, we 
decided to use one representative price which is the simple average wholesale price. Nonetheless we are aware 
that wholesale prices might not be the adequate input price indicator of individual retail stores. Retail chains 
often negotiate prices with supplying firms on a contract basis. These prices might not be correctly be reflected 
by the average wholesale price. Unfortunately those contract prices are not published; however, wholesale prices 
can at the least always be interpreted as opportunity costs and thereby might still have an impact on output price 
decisions even for retailers that have contracted their buy in prices. 
7  To use equal numbers of observations before and after the Euro introduction, our estimation sample starts in 
October 2000. 
8 Because of the small number of observations in some cases we have to be cautious with some conclusions, for 
instance, with respect to DC and retail chains D and F.   10
4 Modelling approach 
As some of the data indicate non-stationary behaviour
9, we start with an error correction 
model (ECM) specification to analyse the price transmission process from wholesale (p
W) to 
retail prices (p
R). In line with other studies, we assume that wholesale prices lead retail 
prices.





it i i t i it ik t k il it l it
kl
pp ppp α γγ β δ ε −− − −
==
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with t as a time index for each week and i as index for each individual retail shop. The 
superscripts  Ri and W indicate retail and wholesale prices, respectively. Allowing for 
individual price adjustments the lag-lengths K and L are determined using the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC). The selected lags of contemporaneous price changes vary from 1 
to 5 weeks in the case of the retailers selling cucumber and from 1 to 8 weeks in the case of 
those retailers that carry carrots. For both products 271 price transmission processes between 
wholesale price and individual retail price are estimated. The period of observed prices lasts 
from October 9
th in 2000 to March 3
rd in 2003.
11 
To test whether the introduction of the Euro had an impact on the individual price 
spread between wholesale and retail prices, we add a dummy and a trend variable to the ECM 
specification (see Equation 2). 
01 2 1 12 1
01
KL
RW R W R
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pD T D p ppp α αα γ γ β δ ε −− − −
==
∆= + + + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∑∑   (2) 
T is a time-trend dummy variable and  it D  is a conventional dummy variable with:  it D =  1  if 
tstart ≤ t ≤ tend and  it D  = 0 otherwise. T covers the numbers from 1 to tend minus tstart for those 
periods and zero otherwise. By means of this dummy variable, a flexible structural adjustment 
of the marketing margin between wholesale and individual retail prices is introduced into the 
                                                 
9 For reasons of brevity we do not present the results of the stationarity tests, but upon request we are pleased to 
provide them. 
10 See amongst others Kinnucan and Forker (1987), Boyd and Brorsen (1988), Pick et al. (1990), Griffith and 
Piggott (1994), Powers (1995), Brooker et al. (1997) and Worth (1999). In addition, because of the high 
concentration of food retailers retail prices are more likely to be endogenous than wholesale prices. 
11 We choose a symmetric period around January 1
st 2002 to equally weight the periods before and after the Euro 
introduction.   11
model. Because theoretically the impact of the Euro is supposed to vanish over time, we 
allow, after the introduction of a structural break at tstart, also for an end of such break at tend. 
Using a trend variable (T) together with the dummy variable ( ) it D  allows reduction (or 
expansion) of the potential shift during the period of the structural break. For each pair of 
individual retail and wholesale prices the most likely structural break is determined by an 
iterative search procedure. Starting (tstart) and ending (tend) points of the structural breaks are 
specified within a grid-search procedure, over all potential starting and ending periods in 
time
12. The search procedures determine for each pair of tstart and tend the critical F-values for 
significance of such structural breaks. Those periods are selected which maximise the F-
value. The resulting periods with the most likely structural break are then related to the 
introduction of the Euro. 
5 Empirical results 
The final sample for the estimation of the structural break procedure explained above consists 
of prices of cucumber and carrots for 271 grocery stores and the two respective wholesale 
prices. The composition of the selected stores is shown in Table 1. Most of the shops are 
combined supermarkets. The other groups are about equally distributed. 
As mentioned above, instead of using the time of introduction of the Euro as a natural 
break point (starting point) we opt for a more flexible model as the market participants had 
full information about the currency introduction. To veil the direct impact of the Euro from 
the public and/or consumers, retailers might have reacted to the new currency prior or after its 
introduction. Therefore it has to be determined what time frame for the structural break is 
considered to be Euro-related. We assume that structural breaks related to the introduction of 
the Euro have to start in the period 4 months prior or post the official introduction of the Euro 
at January 1. 
For the average retail prices we observe no Euro related structural change for the 
cucumber price relationship and no change for carrots price relationship. As we show in the 
following these relationships are not representing the behaviour at the individual store levels 
correctly. 
                                                 
12 Due to reason of degrees of freedom some pairs of starting and ending points have to be excluded.   12
Applying the model to individual store prices, we obtain 148 Euro-related structural 
breaks in the case of cucumber and 62 in the case of carrots (Table 2). Thus in the case of 
cucumber, a remarkable share of about 55 percent of the retail stores indicates a structural 
break related to the introduction of the Euro. As explained above, the impact of the 
introduction of the Euro on the retail price transmission might be a result of a mix of the four 
effects and/or pricing strategies. It is primary expected that the presence of menu costs and in 
particular money illusion lead to higher retail margins, whereby this effect is supposed to fade 
out in time.
13 Thus, we would expect a positive dummy variable and a negative trend-dummy 
to return to the equilibrium prior to the Euro introduction. On the other hand, the impact of 
both price rounding and the timing on price adjustments or other marketing strategies is less 
clear. For example, if sellers have anticipated changes in the consumer behaviour after the 
Euro introduction or if retailers use the Euro to reinforce their low pricing strategy, real price 
could also decrease at the date around the Euro introduction. Thus, also lower retail margins 
could be observed.  
We find that from 147 (62) Euro related structural breaks in the case of cucumber 
(carrots) 75 (43) show a significant positive sign. That is, about 28 (16) percent of all retailers 
indicate effects fitting money illusion and/or menu cost. Within the group of shops that 
indicate a Euro related positive dummy 64 (37) also show a negative trend during the break 
period for cucumber (carrots) prices. 
In about further 27 (7) percent of the stores we observe a negative sign of the Euro 
related structural break dummy. This might be the result of the other Euro induced pricing 
(marketing) strategies as for example the reinforcement of low pricing strategies. 
Some variation in the number of structural breaks between store types and retail chains 
can be observed. Unfortunately, no systematic relationships between the identified structural 
breaks and the store types and/or the products under considerations are easily identifiable, 
which is partly caused by the small number of stores for most store types or retail chains. On 
the other hand some conclusions are not supported by cross commodity comparisons. 
Discounters, for example, show less structural breaks in absolute number and in percentage 
terms for cucumber. The reason might be that discounters have publicly committed 
themselves to not use the Euro introduction to push prices and margins. Moreover, 
                                                 
13  This potential fading is covered by the trend-dummy variable which in this case should show a negative sign.   13
Discounters seem to have reinforced their low price strategy looking at the cucumber market. 
On the other hand, this picture does not fit the observations for the carrot prices. Discounters 
have in 25 percent changed their margin because of the Euro and 47 percent of these changes 
started with price increases at the starting break point. Here, money illusion would explain 
this Euro induced pricing strategy. Following, no conclusive picture can be drawn from the 
observed deviations. The same is to be said about the regional variations in the number of 
structural breaks (Table 3) 
Insert Table 2 and 3 about here 
The estimated coefficients for the dummy variables range from -143 to 290 (-105 to 556) 
Euro cent between shops for cucumber (carrots). Considering the average price levels in the 
period of observations - average price of carrots is about 0.89 Euro per kg, the average price 
of cucumber is about 0.77 Euro per piece - the structural breaks can be called significant from 
an economic point of view.  
Figure 2 shows an example for an individual store price series for cucumber which 
indicated a Euro related structural break. It is clearly seen that this store often set significantly 
above normal margins from end of December 2001 to end of March 2002 compared with 
other periods. A similar picture can be drawn for a margin of an individual store for carrots 
which also shows a significant increase in the margin at the time of the introduction of the 
Euro (Figure 2).  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Besides the magnitude (dummy) and the development of the structural break (trend dummy), 
our model also results the starting and ending point of structural breaks and thereby the length 
of structural breaks can be calculated. In Figure 3 the length of the structural break is drawn 
against the size of the Euro dummy. Most of the structural breaks are short very lived as they 
only last for 2 to ten weeks. With a few exception, in particular those structural breaks of 
larger magnitude last only a few weeks. 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here   14
Conclusions 
In the decades following World War Two the German Mark has gained a remarkable image 
from consumers. This trust in the national currency has been challenged in the process of the 
transition from the Deutschmark to the Euro. Even though this transition was supposed to be 
only a change in the nominal scale, consumers were very much concerned about its impact on 
real prices. Many consumers feared the Euro would be used to enforce real price increase by 
retailers and other suppliers. This fear was strongly taken up and enforced by mass media 
prior to the introduction of the Euro. The economic literature provides several arguments for 
potential impacts of a nominal shock such as the introduction of the Euro on the retail price 
and retail-wholesale margin. 
This study empirically examines the impact of the Euro introduction on the retail-
wholesale price margin in the German food retail sector. In particular, it is hypothesized that 
money illusion and/or menu costs can cause real effects on prices and margins. As the retail 
sector is highly concentrated in Germany, particularly money illusion and/or menu costs 
might have caused an increase in retail margins following the introduction of the Euro in 
Germany in January 2002. Experimental studies proof the potential significance of this effect. 
On the other hand, the impact of price rounding, the timing of price adjustments and pricing 
strategies is less clear. For example, if sellers have anticipated price adjustments or have used 
the Euro to reinforce their pricing strategy, real price decreases at the date around the Euro 
introduction could also be a reasonable reaction. 
We employ a panel data set of food retail prices for 271 Germany grocery stores to 
investigate the empirical impact of the nominal shock caused by the introduction of the Euro 
in the retail sector. As retail stores might have anticipated the effects of the nominal shock and 
because the impact is expected to fade out in time, our model accounts for flexible starting 
and ending points as well as for a smooth transition back to the price equilibrium prior the 
Euro introduction. 
Though on average no significant impact of the Euro introduction is detected, the 
individual price series show some significant changes in the price setting by retailers. In about 
23-55 percent of all stores the vertical price relationship between wholesale and retail prices 
did change around the date of the introduction of the Euro Germany. Most of the detected 
structural breaks indicate significant increases in the retail margins at the starting break point. 
The respective trend dummies mostly show negative signs, which would consistent with the   15
money illusion theory. Further, in about 7-27 percent of the stores we observe a negative sign 
of the Euro related structural breaks. This might be the result of the other Euro induced 
pricing strategy to reinforce a low price image of the store.   16
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Figures and Tables 
Tab. 1: Number store types and retailer companies in the sample for cucumber and 
carrots 
Cucumber   Retailer  chain   





































Total  271  31 49 25 43 35 22  66 
 
Carrots   Retailer  chain   





































Total  271  31 47 25 44 36 22  66 
Notes: SSM: Small supermarkets, BSM: Big supermarkets, DC: Discounter, CSM: Combined supermarkets. A 
to F: Different retailer companies, such as Edeka or Spar group. 
Source: Data by ZMP, 2003. 
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Tab. 2: Number (percentage) of Euro related structural breaks by store type and chain 
[in brackets the number of Euro related structural breaks with a positive dummy] 
 
Cucumber   Retailer  chain   





26 (60%) [14] 
39 (52%) [15] 
29 (48%) [15] 





























Total  148 (55%) [75]  19 (61%)  31 (63%) 10 (40%) 25 (58%) 26 (74%)  10 (46%)  27 (41%)
 
Carrots   Retailer  chain   





9 (21%) [8] 
13 (18%) [11] 
15 (25%) [7] 





























Total  62 (23%) [43]  6 (19%)   6 (13%) 9 (38%) 10 (23%) 9 (25%) 6 (27%)  15 (23%) 
Notes: SSM: Small supermarkets, BSM: Big supermarkets, DC: Discounter, CSM: Combined supermarkets. A 
to F: Different retailer companies, such as Edeka or Spar group. 
Source: Data by ZMP, 2003. 
Tab. 3: Number of Euro related structural breaks by region (In bracket the number of 
Euro related breaks with a positive dummy) 
 
   Region   
Cucumber  1  2 3  4 5  6 7 8 
Number of stores   52  39  30  16  51  33  32  18 
Structural breaks   21 (12)  22 (15)  12 (3) 9 (2)  30 (15)  23 (14)  21 (15)  10 (3) 
In  percent  40  56 40  56 59  70 66 56 
Carrots  1  2 3  4 5  6 7 8 
Number of stores   56  41  31  16  49  28  31  19 
Structural breaks   14 (8)  10 (4)  8 (4)  3 (3)  7 (7)  7 (5)  10 (9)  3 (3) 
In  percent  25  24 26  19 14  25 32 16 
Notes: SSM: Small supermarkets, BSM: Big supermarkets, DC: Discounter, CSM: Combined supermarkets. A 
to F: Different retailer companies, such as Edeka or Spar group. 
Source: Data by ZMP, 2003.   21





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The thick line marks the official introduction of the Euro in January 2002 
Source: Data by ZMP, 2003. 
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Notes: The thick line marks the official introduction of the Euro in January 2002 
Source: Data by ZMP, 2003.   23
Fig. 3: Relationship between the length of the Euro related structural break in prices 
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Source: Data by ZMP, 2003. 